“No Fail” Fridays
[This is the third in a series. It will be a weekly challenge to historians: The Son Tay Raid was a SUCCESS. No qualifier is appropriate. Over these next few Fridays, I’ll show you why.]
There is a word that is too often used in conversations about the Son Tay Raid. That word should be banished from any analysis of the Raid. You could say it’s an ‘f-word.’ We will challenge your thinking. It may take some humility to accept the truth. For far too long, the humility requirement has only been one-way. The truth is only revealed when you can take on a more mature mindset.
28 years before the Son Tay Raiders, the Doolittle Raiders trained at Eglin AFB, at Aux Field #1.
Challenge 3:
To use that certain f-word for the Son Tay Raid, you’d have to use that same word for the Doolittle Raid.
The Doolittle Raid’s plan was for the 16 B-25 Mitchell bombers to land in China in friendly territory. After refueling, they would then fly to military bases to return to service.
As it turned out,
EVERY aircraft was lost,
3 crewmembers died in the mission,
4 crewmembers were executed by the Japanese,
4 became POWs and
5 were held by the Soviets,
…and the Doolittle Raid caused “negligible material damage.”
Doolittle initially believed that these results would lead to his court-martial.
So, given all this, did the Doolittle Raid fail?
Of course not. Not when you consider the prioritized list of objectives.
The primary objective of the Doolittle Raid was to SEND THE MESSAGE that America can strike the enemy’s capital at will. It was to raise the morale of Americans and strike fear in the enemy.
The secondary objectives included…
• Destroy as much of the military industrial targets as possible.
• Recover all the bombers and crews to safe areas in China and return to the fight.
In both the Son Tay Raid and the Doolittle Raid, new intelligence received ONE DAY BEFORE THE LAUNCH forced the commanders to make life-or-death decisions in the Fog of War concerning whether to give the GO order.
IN BOTH CASES, the commanders relied upon their moral clarity, basing their decision on their highest priorities. In both cases, SENDING THE MESSAGE was the highest priority that made them choose to give the GO.
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s assessment at Ft Bragg, December 9th, 1970:
“If a similar chance to save Americans were to arise tomorrow, I would act just as I did in approving and supporting the effort at Son Tay.”
With clarity that comes with the passage of 5 decades, we can see that the unseemly public rebukes led by Senators Fulbright and Gore were—at least in great part—motivated by political gamesmanship. To use that certain f-word today is simply playing along with their game.
See more stories in Who Will Go.
Click Here: The book.