Category Archives: Air Force

Inside the Airborne Command Post, part 20

Listening to every transmission from 35,000 feet

Episode 20 (the final episode).

APPRECIATION by the author(s) of the 20 episodes:

Sergeant Robert J. “Bob” Ruseckas

USAF, March 1967 – March 1971

Linguist in the North Vietnamese dialect

6990th Security Squadron

RC-135M

I truly did not know this much detail about the Son Tay Raid until decades later. I have read as many books and accounts as possible about the Raid and, together with Cliff Westbrook, we’ve pieced together my experiences with the timeline of events from USAF and Army documents, including Colonel Frisbie’s and General Manor’s reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cliff has interviewed many of the participants in the Raid.

We rely heavily upon the world-class research done by John Gargus, Colonel, USAF (retired), and highly recommend you purchase his book The Son Tay Raid: American POWs in Vietnam Were Not Forgotten.

We also appreciate the help of the following:

Robert “Bruce” McClelland, Jr. (6-Op aboard the RC-135M on the Son Tay Raid)

Kirk Carpenter (7-Op aboard the RC-135M on the Son Tay Raid)

Stepen Konstenius (aboard the Navy EP-3 on the Son Tay Raid), host of Veterans Talk Radio on KKXX,

George F. Schreader, author of Hognose Silent Warrior, and

Jim Cavanaugh, RC-135M crewmember, later Deputy Director of Policy at the NSA.

We also appreciate so many of the Son Tay Raid Association members for sharing their recollections.

I would love to listen to those old reel-to-reel tapes again…

Written with the help of Cliff Westbrook, Co-author (with Terry Buckler) of Who will Go: Into the Son Tay POW Camp and Son of Clyde “Neal” Westbrook, Aircraft Commander of Lime 2 on the Son Tay Raid

Our beautiful RC-135M at home at Kadena Air Base.  The “hog-nose” radome housed an extraordinary array of sensors, including a particular doppler radar system needed for unparalleled precision.  Our mission entailed skimming along enemy boundaries.  Straying even slightly into enemy territory would make us fair game for shoot down, as is illustrated in the KAL Flight 007 tragedy of 1983.
Photo provided by Robert Ruseckas.
A mission well executed.
Photo provided by Robert Ruseckas.

Bibliography for the 20 Episodes.

Gargus, John, Col USAF, ret. The Son Tay Raid: American POWs in Vietnam Were Not Forgotten. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010

Schreader, George F.  Hognose Silent Warrior:The USAF’s Airborne Intelligence War in the Final Air Campaigns of Vietnam.  Outskirts Press, 2017

Buckler, Terry, and Westbrook, Cliff.  Who Will Go: Into the Son Tay POW Camp.  Palmetto Publishing, 2020

Image Sources for the 20 Episodes.

Image 1.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c9/P12.jpg

Image 2.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0e/Spoon_rest_B.jpg

Image 3.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/98/North_vietnamese_S-75_SAM_site.JPG

Image 4.

https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/media/chinese-sam-snr-75-fan-song-radar-in-deployment.20553/full?d=1533599402

Image 5.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9c/Antloppk.jpg

Image 6.

https://vietnamtheartofwar.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Fig-15-Nguyen-Duc-Tho-e1585925759930.jpg

Image 7.

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Sov-SAM-Simulator.html

Image 8.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/32/SA-2_Guideline.JPG/1920px-SA-2_Guideline.JPG

Image 9.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d4/S-75_Dvina.jpg/800px-S-75_Dvina.jpg

Image 10.

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Sov-SAM-Simulator.html

Image 11.

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Sov-SAM-Simulator.html

Image 12.

https://witnesscollection.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/A03.12.9-768×524.jpg

Image 13.

https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/airdef/hq-2_7.jpg

Image 14.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/5e/F-105G_with_AGM-78_taking_of_Korat.jpg/1280px-F-105G_with_AGM-78_taking_of_Korat.jpg

Image 15.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-45_Shrike#/media/File:AGM-45_Shrike_detonation.gif

Image 16.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/16/SA-2_Guideline-S-75_Dvina-IMG_6382-white.jpg/1920px-SA-2_Guideline-S-75_Dvina-IMG_6382-white.jpg

Image 17.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/92/F-105_hit_by_SA-2_over_Vietnam.jpg

Image 18.

https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/american-secretary-of-defense-melvin-laird-holds-a-pentagon-press-a-picture-id818839568?s=594×594

Image 19.

Photo provided by Robert Ruseckas.

Image 20.

Photo provided by Robert Ruseckas.

See more photos and stories on this website and in Who Will Go, which is just as much to honor the wives and family as the men themselves.

Click Here:  The audiobook is now available.

Inside the Airborne Command Post, part 19

Listening to every transmission from 35,000 feet

Episode 19.

A quote from Brigadier General Manor’s summary of the Son Tay Raid:

“21 November, Simons and I proceeded to Saigon where we boarded a Pan Am flight for Washington with an intermediate stop in Honolulu. On arrival in Honolulu we were met by Admiral McCain [His son, John was a shot-down aviator in a Hanoi prison at the time, now he’s a distinguished Senator from Arizona] who had canceled our onward Pan AM flight and replaced it with a C-135 command post aircraft.
We visited with Admiral McCain for about two hours, explaining the details of the mission. McCain’s final comment on our departure was, “Don’t let anyone tell you that this mission was a failure. We will learn, as the results develop, that many benefits will accrue as a result of having done this.” We appreciated his comment, but at the time believed that it was intended to ease our disappointment of having failed to rescue POWs. In retrospect it is astonishing to realize how accurate his prophesy was.”


[END NOTE: Unknown to the world, the POWs were immediately reaping tremendous benefits from the Son Tay Raid. Within a couple of days after the raid, all the POWs were consolidated into two POW camps in the heart of Hanoi, ending solitary confinement. As a result, the POWs’ morale soared. Contrary to their daily propaganda from Hanoi Hannah, they now knew that America would not rest until they were home. Together at last, they formed what they called the “4th Allied POW Wing.” They were able to converse face-to-face, take care brothers’ wounds, encourage the despondent, and hold church services. They even set up a schedule of college-level classes in their cells (teaching calculus scraping a rock on dirty concrete) led by whomever was best qualified in a specific subject. Only when the POWs came home in 1973 did anyone find out about these great results of the Son Tay Raid.


Read this facet of the story, told by the POWs themselves, in Who Will Go: Into the Son Tay POW Camp.]

The wing was created by the POWs in prison immediately after the Son Tay Raid brought them all together in the days after the raid.

Here’s how the 4th Allied POW Wing is explained on Wikipedia:

“On November 21, 1970, U.S. Special Forces launched Operation Ivory Coast in an attempt to rescue 61 POWs believed to be held at the Sơn Tây prison camp 23 miles (37 km) west of Hanoi. Fifty-six commandos landed by helicopter and assaulted the prison, but the prisoners had been moved some months earlier and none were rescued. While the raid failed to free any POWs and was considered a significant intelligence failure, it had several positive implications for American prisoners. The most immediate effect was to affirm to the POWs that their government was actively attempting to repatriate them, which significantly boosted their morale. Additionally, soon after the raid all acknowledged American prisoners in North Vietnam were moved to Hỏa Lò so that the North Vietnamese had fewer camps to protect and to prevent their rescue by U.S. forces.[23][24]

The post-raid consolidation brought many prisoners who had spent years in isolation into large cells holding roughly 70 men each. This created the “Camp Unity” communal living area at Hỏa Lò. The increased human contact further improved morale and facilitated greater military cohesion among the POWs.[14][24] At this time, the prisoners formally organized themselves under the 4th Allied POW Wing, whose name acknowledged earlier periods of overseas captivity among American military personnel in World War I, World War II and the Korean War. This military structure was ultimately recognized by the North Vietnamese and endured until the prisoners’ release in 1973.[25]

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird presenting Pappy Kittleson a Silver Star (Pappy’s third) for the Son Tay Raid. Fort Bragg, December 9th, 1970.

See more photos and stories on this website and in Who Will Go, which is just as much to honor the wives and family as the men themselves.

Click Here:  The audiobook is now available.

Inside the Airborne Command Post, part 18

Listening to every transmission from 35,000 feet

Episode 18.

Of the 36 SAMs launched against US aircraft this night, two met their marks, F-105Gs, both.  No American lives were lost.  One F-105 limped back to base in Thailand with its battle damage.  As you heard, the other F-105 that was hit made it to Laos before it became unflyable.  The two crewmembers ejected safely and were rescued at dawn.

*  *  *

When all the excitement is over and things begin to settle down on the airwaves, we are briefed about the “negative items” message.  It’s definitive:  No POWs were found. 

What an emotional let-down. 

On the way back to Kadena AB on Okinawa, I vow to myself that I will get on the next Combat Apple mission to the Gulf of Tonkin.  I want to intercept the North Vietnamese Air Defense Command’s daily reports of air activity from all sectors to their central headquarters.  I know that it will be their assessment of what took place.  We (the US Department of Defense) use that information to craft the wording of our press releases depending on how much the North Vietnamese government knows or doesn’t know at that point.

We land a little after sunrise at Kadena.

I succeed in getting on the next Gulf Bird even though I don’t have proper crew rest.  My good buddy and fellow Vietnamese linguist Bruce McClelland does the same thing.  He too is chomping at the bit to help intercept the North Vietnamese After-Action Reports.

Once back over the Gulf of Tonkin (only a few hours after we’d left), those reports are rich.  In fact, it is so significant that I have the pilot adjust the timing of turns in orbit to be sure not to lose the signals even for a few seconds. 

Finally back on the ground at Okinawa, I insist my way into translating and transcribing the recorded reports, rather than leaving it to shift workers.  Again without proper crew rest, Bruce and I help complete the translating of all the recordings.  We call in other senior linguists to assist with certain technical phrases. 

During that team translation/transcription, Colonel Frisbie yet again hovers over us.  From our work is produced a “Critic” Report due to the US President and National Security Council with highest urgency.  The report explains what the North Vietnamese understood about the events of that night.  

John Gargus explains in his book, The Son Tay Raid: American POWs in Vietnam Were Not Forgotten, that Colonel Frisbie and a major from the 6990th hand carried a copy of the tapes and our report to the Pentagon ASAP.  The first press release came out with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s press conference on Monday November 23rd.

(l-r) Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Colonel Bull Simons, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, Brigadier General LeRoy Manor

See more photos and stories on this website and in Who Will Go, which is just as much to honor the wives and family as the men themselves.

Click Here:  The audiobook is now available.

Inside the Airborne Command Post, part 17

Listening to every transmission from 35,000 feet

Episode 17.

As a proof of the absolute success of the plan, I don’t ever hear the North Vietnamese command authorities explicitly reference the assault force aircraft, neither helicopters nor C-130s.  I only hear references to tracking and launching against the higher altitude aircraft, the fighters.  The Son Tay Raid is a case of “they never knew what hit ’em.”

I must admit I am recording (contrary to our mission briefing instructions) many of the launches—for the guys on the ground who will never experience such a thing—but I keep up with every bit of my raid-focused scanning as instructed.  At least 36 SAMs were launched tonight, an unprecedented amount.

As a trained and experienced TACAIR 7-Op, I’m also keeping an eye on the 7-Op channels.  I see no MiG activity this whole evening.  Our RC-135 even broadcasts an advisory that there is no MiG activity.  On our 7-Op scans, we would have heard radio transmissions from any airfield tower, from the fighter pilots themselves, and would have heard bearing and range information broadcast from the Air Intercept Controllers.  

[NOTE:  Fellow crewmember Kirk Carpenter, a skilled operator and Stan/Eval member senior to me, recently confirmed that he, too, detected zero MIG activity that entire night.  Kirk was trained and experienced in all positions and was in the 7-Op role on the Son Tay Raid.]

Tonight, I would have heard any communication from the SAM or AAA sites to the North Vietnamese MiG fighters on alert at their bases. For instance, SAM and AAA sites would be notified to stand down if their own NVAF aircraft were planned to transit their area.  If I hear this sort of thing, I’ll notify the 7-Op to look for enemy aircraft launched.  I would also have heard the SAM and AAA sites being notified of any NVAF “friendly” fighters accidentally straying near their sector. 

So, we are surprised when suddenly “MiG!!!” is broadcast by one of the helicopters as they are departing to the west.  Immediately in response, our AMS reassures Colonel Frisbie, “No MiGs have taken off.  There are no MiGs in the area.”

The RC-135 broadcasts, “There is no indication of any MiGs airborne.”

The MC-130 Cherry 2 relays this broadcast, “There is no indication of any MiGs.”

But confusion reigns among the helicopters and A-1Es, uncertain what MiGs may or may not be pursuing them.  Multiple of these take evasive maneuvers (diving low and accelerating).  The Thailand GCI Brigham even directs one of the USAF F-4s to turn north to intercept a possible bogey.  It’s quickly determined that this is simply another one of our F-4s exiting.

See more photos and stories on this website and in Who Will Go, which is just as much to honor the wives and family as the men themselves.

Click Here:  The audiobook is now available.

Inside the Airborne Command Post, part 16

Listening to every transmission from 35,000 feet

Episode 16.

2:47am:  When the rattlesnake comes over the headphones, Ted Lowry identifies the “High PRF” (Pulsed Repetition Frequency) signal and Firebird 5 turns inbound again to line up on it.  Pull up 25 degrees.  Launch.  Hard left.  The Shrike hits the bullseye.  At $7,000 per Shrike, that’s a great investment.

No missiles left.  Damaged by an SA-2.  Time to turn southwest and limp to the nearest friendly base, right?  No, they remain on station in orbit.  You see, Don Kilgus and Lowry know they’ve shot all their Shrike missiles.  But Charlie, sitting in a surviving SA-2 site, DOESN’T know that.  Charlie sees the F-105G’s radar signature, so he’s going to think twice before he shines a radar on any more American aircraft tonight.

2:55am:  When Brigham (the call sign of the Ground Controlled Intercept operators at Udorn RTAFB) announces that all other US aircraft have left the area, Firebird 1 tells his wingmen, “Firebirds egress,” Kilgus updates his status: “Firebird 5 is hit.  We’re losing fuel and we need a tanker to head this way.”  Kilgus says to Lowry, “Ted we don’t have enough gas to get home.  Put in the SAFE areas (Safe Area For Ejection) in the doppler and we’ll head there.”  He then Cruise-Climbs (the most fuel-efficient climb) to 32,000 ft because he knows they will need as much altitude as possible to get maximum distance in a flamed-out glide.  During this climb, Firebird 5 is talking to Brigham, who is vectoring a KC-135 tanker directly to them. 

Other aircraft mistakenly think Firebird 5 is in afterburner because they see flames trailing behind.  Actually, it’s the fuel streaming from the fuselage, igniting at the burner can.

3:05am:  Firebird 5 leaves North Vietnamese airspace at 32,000 ft, (an unusually high altitude for a Thud) and aims toward a SAFE area to minimize the chance of falling into hostiles.

3:14am:  Kilgus notifies Brigham, “Firebird 5 is flameout” and begins a best glide of 300 knots.  They lose more than 1000 ft per mile.  They make final preparations to eject.

3:16am:  A KC-135 is now on station, ready for a refueling at FL210.  All are professionals trying to think of any options.  Brigham gives relative positions of the aircraft, but there is no real hope of a flamed-out refueling.  Several miles separated in the dark of night, the Thud never makes visual contact with the tanker.  Already thousands of feet below the tanker, Kilgus calmly jokes, “Ask the Tanker to open his side door and maybe these seats will get us to him.”  His last radio call: “If I don’t make it, tell the guys at the bar that I didn’t screw up—the SAM just got me.”

3:17am:   At 12,000 ft, all preparations made, Kilgus says, “Ted it’s time for you to go.”  Lowry pulls his ejection handles.  Kilgus is out of the jet a few seconds later.

The portion of this video from 26:30 to 36:30 describes the Shrike and the F-105G.

See more photos and stories on this website and in Who Will Go, which is just as much to honor the wives and family as the men themselves.

Click Here:  The audiobook is now available.