Category Archives: Marines

The Doolittle Raid and the Son Tay Raid.

“No Fail” Fridays

[This is the third in a series. It will be a weekly challenge to historians: The Son Tay Raid was a SUCCESS. No qualifier is appropriate. Over these next few Fridays, I’ll show you why.]

There is a word that is too often used in conversations about the Son Tay Raid. That word should be banished from any analysis of the Raid. You could say it’s an ‘f-word.’ We will challenge your thinking. It may take some humility to accept the truth. For far too long, the humility requirement has only been one-way. The truth is only revealed when you can take on a more mature mindset.

28 years before the Son Tay Raiders, the Doolittle Raiders trained at Eglin AFB, at Aux Field #1.

Challenge 3:
To use that certain f-word for the Son Tay Raid, you’d have to use that same word for the Doolittle Raid.

The Doolittle Raid’s plan was for the 16 B-25 Mitchell bombers to land in China in friendly territory. After refueling, they would then fly to military bases to return to service.

As it turned out,
EVERY aircraft was lost,
3 crewmembers died in the mission,
4 crewmembers were executed by the Japanese,
4 became POWs and
5 were held by the Soviets,
…and the Doolittle Raid caused “negligible material damage.”

Doolittle initially believed that these results would lead to his court-martial.

So, given all this, did the Doolittle Raid fail?
Of course not. Not when you consider the prioritized list of objectives.
The primary objective of the Doolittle Raid was to SEND THE MESSAGE that America can strike the enemy’s capital at will. It was to raise the morale of Americans and strike fear in the enemy.

The secondary objectives included…
• Destroy as much of the military industrial targets as possible.
• Recover all the bombers and crews to safe areas in China and return to the fight.

In both the Son Tay Raid and the Doolittle Raid, new intelligence received ONE DAY BEFORE THE LAUNCH forced the commanders to make life-or-death decisions in the Fog of War concerning whether to give the GO order.
IN BOTH CASES, the commanders relied upon their moral clarity, basing their decision on their highest priorities. In both cases, SENDING THE MESSAGE was the highest priority that made them choose to give the GO.
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s assessment at Ft Bragg, December 9th, 1970:

“If a similar chance to save Americans were to arise tomorrow, I would act just as I did in approving and supporting the effort at Son Tay.”

With clarity that comes with the passage of 5 decades, we can see that the unseemly public rebukes led by Senators Fulbright and Gore were—at least in great part—motivated by political gamesmanship. To use that certain f-word today is simply playing along with their game.

Raiders trained at a small secluded Eglin Field airstrip (“Aux Field #1”), pushing their bombers to take off within the 450ft of “runway” they would have onboard the carrier Hornet.

See more stories in Who Will Go.

Click Here:  The book.

Today we first laid eyes on Barbara…

Monday October 19th, 1970

…exactly 50 years ago today.

Security was tight. We were kept in the dark.
Then, on Monday October 19th, we were introduced to Barbara. She was a sight to behold! Everyone had been wanting to lay eyes on her. She was the talk of the week. She was housed in a separate building away from us and each of us was required to study her so that we had a mental image of every inch of her. Barbara was a model. And someday, Barbara would be famous.

When I was with her, I used a prism to study her so that, when the time was right and I exited the chopper, I would be oriented to everything around me. It was time well spent. You see, Barbara was a precise scale replica of a military compound (the Son Tay POW camp), created from CIA photographs taken from Buffalo Hunter drones and SR-71 manned reconnaissance aircraft. It was codenamed “Barbara” after Barbara L. Strosnider, a secretary from the United States Air Force Directorate of Plans, at the Pentagon where the model was created.

The CIA had done an excellent job of detailing the terrain and buildings at the camp. One item that really fascinated me was the bicycle that was parked in front of the Communications Building that Capt Dan and I had to neutralize as quickly as we could before enemy reinforcements could be alerted. On the night of the raid, as we approached the actual building—sure as heck—the bicycle was there!

The intel we had was amazing and the intel community deserves praise. Sadly, there are too many armchair quarterbacks who have a political agenda when they criticize the intel.

Barbara is in this photo.

You can see a full color “pin up” of Barbara in Who Will Go.

Click Here:  The book.

Admiral McCain’s calculation.

Friday October 16th
“No Fail” Fridays

[This is the second in a series. It will be a weekly challenge to historians: The Son Tay Raid was a SUCCESS. No qualifier is appropriate. Over these next few Fridays, I’ll show you why.]
There is a word that is too often used in conversations about the Son Tay Raid. That word should be banished from any analysis of the Raid.

Challenge 2:

The Son Tay Raid’s highest objective was to SEND THE MESSAGE TO ALL THE POWs.
Consider this: The Raid was never designed to rescue ALL the American POWs. At the most, it would have rescued merely 15% of the POWs held by the North Vietnamese Government! No, the primary mission was to SEND THE MESSAGE to ALL THE POWS: “America is doing EVERYTHING possible to bring you home.”

The commanders’ calculation:
• The Raid would raise the morale of all the other POWs and
• It would strike fear into the heart of the enemy and
• The POTENTIALITY of reprisals against the remaining POWs was outweighed by the ACTUALITY of the hell they were currently living (some had been in solitary confinement never hearing an American voice for a year at a time) and
• EVEN IF IT BRINGS HOME NO POWS, it will send the message to the current and future generations that we will stop at nothing to get them home!

Among the other objectives:
• Rescue as many POWs as possible and, where feasible, return them to the fight.
• Put the communist government of North Vietnam on notice that the US can operate with impunity anywhere in their country.

Consider the gentleman in the photo below.
Each year while Admiral Jack McCain was CINCPAC (Commander in Chief of Pacific Command), he paid a Christmastime visit to the American troops in South Vietnam serving closest to the DMZ.

Admiral McCain would stand alone at the DMZ for a few silent moments and look north to be as close to his son as he could get.

Brigadier General Donald Blackburn, who first conceived the raid, told this story:
As the top-secret plan got approval with the CIA, DIA, and Kissinger, Gen Blackburn told Admiral [Thomas H.] Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “We need to tell McCain about this.” On the day that Blackburn briefed Admiral McCain, the admiral almost had tears. He said, “Don, how about coming back this afternoon. I’ll discuss this further with you then.”
As Blackburn was escorted down the hall, Admiral McCain’s aide said, “You know about the son?”
In that afternoon meeting, McCain said, “You have got 100 percent support from me.”
Blackburn explains that, throughout the entire operation, McCain “supported us beautifully–anything we wanted.”

The risks were fully understood. Admiral McCain knew that the odds of his son being among the POWs rescued were extremely low and that there was a chance of reprisals against the remaining POWs. With full knowledge of that risk, he and the other commanders knew that the highest of the many priorities was to send the message.

It was a success.

What would happen to his son after the Son Tay Raid.

12 POWs candidly tell us stories about the Son Tay Raid in Who Will Go.

Click Here:  The book.

The greatest thing that happened in Vietnam…

“No Fail” Fridays
[This is the first in a series. It will be a weekly challenge to historians: The Son Tay Raid was a SUCCESS. No qualifier is appropriate. Over these next few Fridays, I’ll show you why.]

Challenge 1: There is a word that is too often used in conversations about the Son Tay Raid. That word should be banished from any analysis of the Raid. You could say it’s an ‘F-word.’ We will challenge your thinking. It may take some humility to accept the truth. For far too long, the humility requirement has only been one-way. The truth is only revealed when you can take on a more mature mindset.
* The simple mind obsesses over what is seen.
* The mature perspective takes into consideration the unseen (for two-and-a-half years after the Raid, there was major progress that no one outside Hanoi was aware of.)
* The simple mind is swayed by immediate shiny objects like punditry and political gossip.
* The mature mind trusts that a little time is needed to gather all the facts (even though Senators Gore and Fulbright and others were relentless in publicly scolding and scoring political points, the civilian and military commanders were mature in accepting the heat knowing they had made the right decision to approve the mission.)
* The simple mind is slave to personal bias against a political leader.
* The mature mind weighs the actual results, letting the data objectively guide their conclusions.

In yesterday’s photo, you saw President Nixon and Dr Kissinger. At least half of our country has pre-conceived biases against them. I’d like to challenge all of us give them credit for their noble intentions. Can we be humble enough to do that?

Humility accepts ambiguity in this world and doesn’t worry excessively about what other people will think. A commander has to make decisions even in the Fog of War. And character is to be judged in how they deal with the Friction of War—when things don’t go fully as you planned. Do you blame? Do you distance yourself from the results of your decisions? Or, to protect your image, do you avoid making difficult decisions in the first place?

It is important to note that yesterday’s Oval Office photo was AFTER the Raid. Nixon and his leaders did not distance themselves. They weighed all the best intel that technology could provide, committed themselves to the Raid’s prioritized list of objectives, made the hard decisions, and, with heroic integrity, stood publicly to honor the men who laid their lives on the line for their fellow man. We’ll post more photos of how proud America is of the Son Tay Raid.

When you consider this, how do you feel about President Nixon’s decision to approve the Son Tay Raid?

US Senator Jeremiah Denton (formerly a POW and then an Admiral) said it this way:

“The Son Tay Raid was the greatest thing that happened in Vietnam.”

Right to Left: Gen James Cartwright, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Senator Jeremiah Denton at the National POW/MIA Recognition Day Ceremony at the Pentagon on Sept. 18, 2009.

Reading the Raiders’ stories in Who Will Go will challenge historians (and maybe you.)

Click Here:  The book.

The Air Force MC-130s training at Eglin AFB…

Tuesday Sept 29th, 1970

…exactly 50 years ago this week.

Story by USAF Major Irl Franklin, Cherry 1

After arriving at Eglin and getting our aircraft bedded down, we were ushered into the briefing room at Special Operations Forces (SOF) Headquarters. Much to my surprise, we walked into a group of 200 people. I noticed Special Forces, other Army personnel (UH-1 pilots), Air Force personnel including A-1 crews, HH-53 crews, HH-3 crews and LtCol Albert “Friday” Blosch’s MC-130 Combat Talon crew from Pope AFB. Then, focusing upon the front of the room, I noticed BGen Leroy Manor, Colonel Bull Simons, and some HQ USAF Staff.

We were told, “You are here to work on a joint exercise that could develop into a dangerous mission. If anyone in the room wishes to be excused, you may leave now, and no questions will be asked.”

A silence fell over those gathered.

People looked around the room and at the front of the room and did not move. A period went by with no one moving or speaking, then BGen Manor said, “Excellent. I am glad you are all with us because you have all been chosen for your unique experience and abilities which will make the mission a success.” Administrative details were covered and we were dismissed to go to our quarters to ponder the next actions.

The next day, Combat Talon (MC-130) aircraft commanders along with one navigator and one electronic warfare officer (EWO) from each crew met with the chiefs of the A-1 group, the helicopter group, and the Special Forces group in the SOF briefing room. This time we were briefed on the mission and the training that we would undergo. We were told of the mission objective, the deployment bases, and were asked to develop the routes and methods of getting to Son Tay.

Thus, began numerous days of flight planning! The remaining crew members and participants were to be kept in the dark as to the mission we were training for. (KITD-FOHS: Kept In The Dark—Fed Only Horse S**t)

We had aerial photos of the routes, the POW camp, and other items of interest (such as SAM sites). We had our own photo interpreter and intelligence people available.

Cherry 1 (Photo provided by Bill Guenon)
Standing (l-r): Sgt Robert Renner (support), TSgt William Kennedy, TSgt James Shepard, MSgt Leslie Tolman, TSgt Kenneth Lightle, SSgt Earl Parks.
Front: Major Thomas Mosley, Capt James McKenzie, Capt Thomas Stiles, Capt Thomas Eckart, Capt William Guenon, Capt Randall Custard, Major Irl Franklin

Read the rest of Irl Franklin’s story in Who Will Go.

Click Here:  The book.